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Abstract—With the ubiquity of wireless network and the
intelligentization of machines, internet of things (IoT) has come
to people’s horizon. Device-to-device (D2D), as one advanced
technique to achieve the vision of IoT, supports a high speed peer-
to-peer transmission without fixed infrastructure forwarding
which can enable fast content distribution in local area. In this
paper, we address the content distribution problem by multi-
hop D2D communication with decentralized content providers
locating in the networks. We consider a cross-layer multi-
dimension optimization involving frequency, space, and time, to
minimize the network average delay. Considering the multicast
feature, we first formulate the problem as a coalitional game
based on the payoffs of content requesters, and then, propose a
time-varying coalition formation based algorithm to spread the
popular content within the shortest possible time. Simulation
results show that the proposed approach can achieve a fast
content distribution across the whole area, and the performance
on network average delay is much better than other heuristic
approaches.
Index Terms—cross-layer optimization, device-to-device, con-
tent distribution, multihop transmission, coalition formation
game.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivation
BASED on the requirements of network ubiquity andmachine intelligence in future economic production and
life, the concept that internet of things (IoT) has come to
people’s horizon [1], and the interconnection of all things
has boosted the development of quite a number of techniques
[2]. Device-to-device (D2D) communication, as one of the
critical components for the next generation mobile networks,
supports a high speed peer-to-peer transmission without fixed
infrastructure data forwarding [3]. Due to the flexibility of
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network deployment, the advantage of proximity connection
on data rate, and the capability of cellular data offloading,
D2D has also been considered as one advanced technique to
achieve the vision of IoT [4], [5].
One distinct advantage of D2D communication is that it
can dramatically improve the spectrum efficiency and network
throughput by reusing cellular radio resources [6]–[9]. Based
on the data analysis report provided by Cisco [10], the wireless
data traffic is mainly distributed in local hotspots, where it
exists an extremely high user density, e.g., a playground, a
public transport, a conference hall, and so on. In such areas,
high volumes of data traffic always lead to network congestion
and user interruption [11]–[14]. Actually, a situation occurred
frequently that most of users in the hotspots request for the
same content. For instance, visitors attempt to download the
electronic map or other multimedia information of a play-
ground. In a traditional way, the content has to be transmitted
repeatedly from a fixed infrastructure to each visitor, which
seriously degrades the system performance [15]. Therefore,
D2D technique can be applied to distribute the popular content
from the content holder to interested users directly via single-
hop or multihop transmission, offloading large amounts of data
from infrastructures [16].
Some existing works have paid attention to content distri-
bution through D2D communications [17]–[21]. Most of these
researches consider a centralized content provider, i.e., the
base station (BS), who pushes the requested content to a set of
selected users as seeds first, and then the seed users transmit
the content to others in their multicast group by D2D links. In
such case, the BS cannot completely separate itself from data
downloading process, which still places a burden of data traffic
on the BS. Therefore, we put emphasis on content distribution
problem with some decentralized content providers locating in
the hotspot, which have already acquired the content from the
BS or other fixed infrastructures.
The above mentioned scenario brings large challenges to
the system. Firstly, the locations of content holders (transmit-
ters) are random and uncertain, which makes it difficult to
determine the multicast group. Especially for the users with
terrible channel conditions from any transmitter, they may
need multihop transmissions to obtain the data, and thus, the
routes of content distribution need to be optimized. Secondly,
average transmission delay is one of the most important
indicators used to measure the network performance, and there
is a tradeoff between a single-hop and a multihop link on
minimizing the network average delay. In addition, since the
D2D links reuse the cellular spectrum that brings co-channel
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interference to both cellular and D2D layers, an efficient
resource allocation scheme for D2D multicasting is required
to further optimize the system performance. Based on these
considerations, the core objective of our work is to spread
the popular content that initiated from decentralized content
holders within the shortest possible time.
B. Contributions
In this paper, we study a cross-layer optimization method
for cooperative content distribution by combining media ac-
cess control (MAC) layer and network layer involving three
dimensions, i.e., frequency, space, and time. Considering the
cooperative relationship among D2D users, we employ coop-
erative game [22] to solve the content distribution problem.
Specifically, we model the process of multicast group estab-
lishment as a coalition formation game [23], in which players
form coalitions to improve their own profits. Some works have
used the coalition formation game for content downloading in
vehicular networks [24] and spectrum sharing in D2D under-
lay networks [25]. In our problem, the cooperator locations,
multihop routes, and co-channel interferences should be jointly
considered. The main contributions are summarized as below:
 We investigate a cross-layer design for content distri-
bution to completely offload the cellular data from the
BS by multihop D2D networks. We propose a coalition
formation game to determine the multicast group. In
the game, the minimization of network average delay is
formulated as the utility function, which is transferred
to each D2D user’s payoff. Moreover, cellular users are
selfless to join in coalitions and share their spectrum
resources with D2D links.
 We design a multihop routing scheme when the channel
condition between the content requester and the content
holder cannot support a direct single-hop link. Jointly
considering the coalition formation and the multihop
scenario, we propose a multi-dimension optimization
algorithm to solve the content distribution problem with
the purpose of minimizing the network average delay.
 The proposed coalition formation is proved to converge to
a Nash-stable equilibrium, and complexity of the whole
algorithm is analyzed theoretically. In the simulation, we
provide a comparison of the proposed cooperative game
based approach, a non-cooperative approach and the
random access approach. Numerical results show that the
proposed approach achieves a considerable performance
gain in the network average delay.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we introduce some related works and discuss the differences
between them and our work. Section III provides the sys-
tem model including channel model and content distribution
model, and Section IV gives the optimization problem with
objective function of minimizing the network average delay.
In Section V, we first reformulate the content distribution
problem as coalition formation games within multiple time
slots, and then describe the game-theoretical algorithm with
relevant concepts and analysis. The numerical results and
discussions are provided in Section VI. Finally, we conclude
the paper in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORKS
The purpose of this work is to investigate a cross-layer
solution for content distribution through D2D communica-
tions. Especially, due to the terrible direct channel conditions,
multihop transmissions should be taken into account, and
routing selection naturally becomes a key problem [26]–[28].
In [26], the authors proposed a multihop cooperative routing
path selection algorithm, which simultaneously improves the
throughput of primary users and the success possibility of
secondary users who opportunistically exploit the licensed
spectrum preoccupied by primary users. The authors in [29]
investigated a scenario that mobile devices have the same
demand toward a common content and cooperatively down-
load the content through multihop D2D link. Three greedy
algorithms with different grouping strategies were proposed to
investigate the tradeoff between performance and complexity.
In [30], the authors proposed a novel framework to enable
devices to form multihop D2D connections, and maintain
sustainable communication in the presence of device mobility.
A tractable theoretical framework was proposed in [31] to
analyze the performance of D2D in the co-channel interference
scenario. The shortest-path-routing algorithm was used for
both uplink and downlink multihop D2D transmission. In [32],
D2D communication was employed to extend the coverage
area of active base station, which significantly improves both
the energy and spectral efficiency performance compared to
conventional cellular networks.
Previous works mentioned above have solved the multihop
D2D routing problem. However, most of them have not
taken co-channel interference into consideration. Although the
co-channel interference was considered in [31], it has not
involved content distribution problem and transmission delay
minimization through the whole network.
Coalition game is a powerful tool which attracts intensive
attentions [33]–[37] from both academia and industry. The
authors in [33] proposed an coalition formation algorithm
which enables the users to autonomously decide whether to
join or leave a coalition based on the rule of minimizing their
average download delay. In [38], the optimization problem of
multi-hop D2D communication was formulated as a coalition
graph game, then a dynamic algorithm based on local best
response and a near-optimal algorithm based on switching
operation were proposed to solve the problem. The authors
in [39] proposed a cooperative approach using coalitional
graph game to establish a peer-to-peer vehicular network, and
adopted the cognitive radio technique to implement vehicle-
to-vehicle transmissions.
Although the coalition game has been used to solve the
content distribution and multihop routing problems in some
works, none of them have ever taken both of the two prob-
lems into consideration simultaneously. In [39], the coalition
game was used to reduce the transmission delay of content
distribution, but the authors just considered the scenario that
only one transmitter is allowed to transmit the content in each
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time slot, which means that the resource allocation problem
has not been involved.
By taking the multihop D2D communication and the re-
source allocation into consideration, the content distribution
problem in this paper can be highly complex, which is
difficult to solve in a direct way because it involves multi-
dimension optimization, i.e., frequency, space, and time. In
order to reduce the average delay of D2D content requesters
receiving the content, and improve the efficiency of content
distribution, we formulate the route selection and resource
allocation problem as a cooperative game, and then propose a
coalition formation algorithm to solve the problem.
There are some previous studies which solved content
distribution problem by applying similar approaches to this
paper [22], [23]. The authors in [22] formulated the energy-
efficiency content dissemination problem as a nontransferable
utility game, and solved it by applying a distributed coalition
formation algorithm. The optimization objective of this work
is energy efficiency while our work focuses on minimizing the
average delay of content distribution, which is definitely dif-
ferent. Moreover, multihop transmission scheme and resource
allocation have not been involved in [22]. In [23], the authors
investigated relay-based schemes in cellular systems, and they
proposed a cooperative content uploading scheme to reduce the
content upload delay. The key issue considered in this work is
to employ multihop D2D communication to upload contents
to the eNodeB, which is totally different from our work.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we consider a hotspot area with one serving
BS, multiple traditional cellular users (CUEs), and other users
who request for the same popular content. Each user can obtain
the content from either the BS, or another user via direct D2D
links. Here, we assume that the cellular system is fully loaded,
and thus new content requests need to be responded by D2D
communications. The users who have already obtained the
content can act as transmitters, and they transmit the content to
their neighbour content requesters (CRs) by multicast mode.
There exist three key problems in this scenario: 1) Given
some random locations of transmitters, how to determine the
multicast group so that the network average delay can be
minimized; 2) How to design a resource allocation scheme for
D2D multicast to improve the system performance; 3) For the
users with bad channel conditions from any transmitter, how
to design a multihop routing scheme to optimize the average
delay.
As illustrated in Fig. 1, the requested popular content has
already been obtained by part of users named original content
holders (OCHs), which are randomly distributed in the hotspot.
The CRs can receive data from the decentralized OCHs
by D2D multicast transmissions reusing the uplink cellular
resource blocks (RBs). Each CUE in the system occupies one
orthogonal RB, which can be reused by at most one D2D
multicast group within one time slot, and meanwhile, each
multicast group can only use one RB for content distribution.
We assume that there are C cellular users, andM D2D users
including K original content holders and M  K (M > K)
Fig. 1. System model of content distribution in multihop D2D networks.
content requesters. All the cellular users are randomly dis-
tributed in the cell, and the OCHs and the CRs are randomly
distributed in the hotspot. The sets of D2D users and cellular
users are denoted byM = f1; 2;    ;Mg, C = f1; 2;    ; Cg,
respectively. We use mt to denote a D2D transmitter, i.e.,
content holder (CH) who broadcasts the content in a multicast
group, m to denote a CR in the group, and c to denote a CUE
and the corresponding RB. We have 8m;mt 2 M, 8c 2 C.
It is noted that when some of D2D receivers (CRs) finish
the content reception, they would transform into transmitters
and multicast to other users without content, i.e., once the
CRs receive the content from the OCHs, their roles would
be turned into CHs. This process continues until all the CRs
obtain the content, and as a consequence, the number of D2D
transmitters (CHs) and receivers (CRs) in the network is not
fixed and it varies over time. As shown in Fig. 1, when CR2
receives the content from OCH2, it will transform into CH3
and broadcast the content to CR3 and CR4 in the next time
interval.
For the channel model, the Rayleigh fading is used to model
the small-scale fading, and the free space propagation path-loss
is used to model the large-scale fading. Considering the co-
channel interference, if CR m receives signal from CH mt on
RB c, it receives interference from CUE c, and meanwhile the
BS is exposed to interference from CH mt. Thus, the signal
to interference plus noise radio (SINR) at CR m on RB c can
be expressed as
cmt;m =
PDh
2
mtm
PCh2cm +N0
=
PDd
 
mtmh
2
s;mtm
PCd
 
cmh2s;cm +N0
; (1)
where PD and PC denote the transmit power of D2D users
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and cellular users, respectively. hmtm is the channel response
of D2D link while hcm is the channel response of interference
link from the CUE. dmtm denotes the transmission distance
between D2D transmitter mt and receiver m, and dcm is the
distance between cellular user and D2D receiver.  is the large-
scale fading path-loss exponent of the transmission channel.
hs;mtm and hs;cm denote the small-scale fading (Rayleigh)
channel coefficients, which obey the complex Gaussian distri-
bution CN (0; 1). N0 is the one-sided power spectral density
of the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN).
Similarly, the SINR received by the BS on RB c is
mtc =
PCh
2
cB
PDh2mtB +N0
=
PCd
 
cB h
2
s;cB
PDd
 
mtB
h2s;mtB +N0
: (2)
Here, hcB represents the channel response of cellular link, and
hmtB represents the channel response of interference link from
D2D transmitter to the BS. dcB , dmtB denote the distance
between CUE c and the BS, the distance between D2D
transmitter mt and the BS, respectively. hs;cB and hs;mtB
are the corresponding small-scale fading channel coefficients.
In the process of content distribution, the network average
delay is the key indicator to measure the system performance.
The popular content should be transmitted in priority through
a high quality channel with a high transmission rate. By giving
the SINR of D2D receivers, the transmission rate of D2D link
can be obtained by
rcmt;m = log2(1 + 
c
mt;m) = log2(1 +
PDd
 
mtmh
2
s;mtm
PCd
 
cmh2s;cm +N0
):
(3)
Thus, the transmission delay from CH mt to CR m reusing
RB c can be expressed as
tcmt;m =
A
Wrcmt;m
=
A
W log2(1 +
PDd
 
mtmh
2
s;mtm
PCd
 
cmh2s;cm+N0
)
: (4)
Here, A represents the size of popular content in bits, and W
denotes the bandwidth of RB in Hz.
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The purpose of this work is to achieve content distribution
within possible minimum network average delay by multihop
D2D communications so that the BS can be completely sep-
arated from data transmission. According to the optimization
objective, the users who have already obtained the content
should multicast to its neighbour CRs that have not obtained
the content as long as there are reusable RBs (can be occupied
by one CUE). Hence, we need to consider a multi-dimension
optimization problem involving frequency, space, and time.
Fig. 2 shows a timeline of content distribution process, where
“Ei” (i = 1; 2;    :) denotes the event that a D2D multicast
group has finished the content distribution. The entire time is
divided into consecutive time slots, which keeps synchronized
with the cellular system. At the beginning of any time slot, a
CH starts to transmit the content in its multicast group. Note
that “Si” (i = 1; 2;    :) represents a multicast group, and
the figure illustrates the transmit durations of some multicast
groups. We set the length of time slot as Ts.
Fig. 2. Timeline of content distribution process.
In the multihop transmission scenario, the time for a CR
to obtain the requested content includes two parts, the delay
of its content provider (transmitter) receiving the data and
the transmission delay from the transmitter to the CR. For
simplicity, we ignore the processing delay. Based on the
system synchronization, the transmission should start at the
initial time of any time slot. Thus, the delay of CRm obtaining
the content can be expressed as
T cmt;m = nmtTs + t
c
mt;m; (5)
where nmt represents the number of time slots that CH mt
spends in obtaining the content. tcmt;m is the transmission
delay of CR m receiving the requested content from CH mt
on RB c defined in (4).
To minimize the network average delay, we need to design
a cross-layer optimization mechanism for deciding the content
provider for CRs and allocating the RBs to the multicast
groups. We use binary variables xmt;m;c (8mt;m 2 M; c 2
C) to formulate the decision results. xmt;m;c = 1 represents
that CR m receives data from CH mt reusing RB c. Based
on these settings, our work is to design the binary decision
variables fxmt;m;cg to minimize the average delay of the
whole system. Therefore, the problem can be formulated as
a mixed integer nonlinear programming (MINLP)
min
fxmt;m;cg
1
M  K
X
m2M
X
mt2M
X
c2C
xmt;m;cT
c
mt;m
s.t. C1 : cmt;m  Dmin; 8mt;m 2M; c 2 C;
C2 : mtc  Cmin; 8c 2 C;mt 2M;
C3 : xmt;m;c 2 f0; 1g;8mt;m 2M; c 2 C;
C4 :
X
mt2M;c2C
xmt;m;c  1; 8m 2M; (6)
where C1 and C2 guarantee the QoS requirements of trans-
mission links. Dmin and 
C
min denote the SINR threshold of
D2D links and cellular links, respectively. The inequalities in
C4 ensure that each CR can obtain the content from at most
one CH, that is, join in one multicast group, while reusing at
most one cellular RB.
V. COALITION FORMATION GAME BASED CONTENT
DISTRIBUTION APPROACH IN MULTIHOP D2D NETWORKS
Considering the multicast feature of content distribution, we
introduce a coalition formation game based approach to solve
the cross-layer optimization problem in this section. First,
we formulate the original problem as a coalitional game by
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defining an utility function for each multicast group. Then, we
give some concepts of coalition formation. At last, we describe
the details of content distribution algorithm.
A. Coalitional Game
In the proposed content distribution problem, we consider
the performance of the average delay experienced by all the
CRs in the network. For a D2D multicast group, there exist
one CH, multiple CRs, and only one RB is reused for multicast
transmissions. We define the utility function of multicast group
Smt as the average transmission delay of all the CRs in the
group, and given by
U(Smt) =  
1
jSmt j
X
m2Smt ;c2Smt
tcmt;m: (7)
Here, jSmt j denotes the number of CRs in the group Smt . Note
that the negative sign indicates that the utility of a multicast
group is inversely proportional to the average delay.
As the content is transmitted in multicast groups, we can
formulate the content distribution problem as a coalitional
game, and each group constitutes a coalition. In the coalition
game, each user acts as a game player and tends to join in a
coalition so that it can receive the content and minimize its
delay, and meanwhile, do not increase the average delay of
CRs in the group, i.e., have a positive effect on the utility of
the coalition. We define the coalitional game as (G; V ), where
G denotes the set of users who participate in the game, and
V is the value of a coalition. In this paper, we naturally treat
the utility function in (7) as the value function, thus it has
V (Smt) =

U(Smt); if Smt 6= ;;
0; otherwise: (8)
where Smt  G. In the formulated game, each coalition
contains one CH, multiple CRs and one CUE who shares its
RB for D2D multicast communications. We use mt as the
subscript to identify coalitions.
For each CR, it tends to seek for its ideal CH and RB
(provided by cooperative CUE) to obtain the content with
minimum transmission delay. When the content has been
received by all the CRs in a coalition, the RB is released, and
the CRs can immediately transform into CHs and provide the
content for other CRs in the next-hop transmission. Therefore,
each coalition tends to reduce the average delay as much as
possible. Whether a CR can be allowed to join in a coalition
depends on its contribution to the coalition value, i.e., a CR
may be refused if it seriously increases the average delay of
a multicast group. Thus, the payoff of each CR in a coalition
is defined as the individual contribution to the coalition value.
Hence, we can derive the payoff of CR m, 8m 2 M, in
coalition Smt as
mtm = V (Smt [ fmg)  V (Smt); (9)
where Smt [ fmg denotes that CR m joins in the coalition
Smt .
In the game, CUEs join in the coalitions to provide their
RBs for the multicast transmissions. Since one RB can only be
reused by one coalition for the content distribution, we must
guarantee that there only exists one CUE in each coalition.
As the spectrum resources are controlled by the system, we
assume that CUEs are selfless and willing to share its RB,
thus the payoff of each CUE in a coalition is defined as the
coalition value. The payoff of CUE c joining in coalition Smt
can be given by
mtc = V (Smt [ fcg): (10)
A CUE selects to join in the coalition who gives a highest
payoff to it, but only the CUE has the highest payoff can join
in the coalition selected by multiple CUEs.
B. Coalition Formation Concepts
Next, we introduce a coalition formation based approach to
solve the proposed coalitional game. Firstly, we give several
definitions as follows.
Definition 1: A collection of all coalitions is defined as a
set, denoted by P = fSmtg, mt 2 M, and Smt  G denotes
the mutually disjoint coalitions. A collection is an arbitrary
combination of coalitions Smt . If it exists
S
Smt2P Smt = G,
the collection P is regarded as a partition of G.
For the considered scenario, there might exist CRs that
cannot satisfy the D2D channel quality requirement no matter
what coalition they join in, thus the collection of coalitions
does not necessarily contain all the users of G. In the process
of coalition formation, the CRs are allowed to join or leave
a coalition based on the defined preferences. Each CR would
compare and order its potential coalition based on the payoff
calculated by (9). To obtain the preferences, we introduce the
concept of coalition preference as below.
Definition 2: Consider two different collections of coali-
tions P = fS1; S2; :::g and Q = fS1 ; S2 ; :::g, both of which
are partitions of the same subset of G, i.e., G0  G. The
comparison relation of any two partitions is denoted by .
For instance, P G0 Q implies the way that P partitions G0 is
superior to the way that Q partitions G0, i.e., P is preferred.
For the CRs that cannot satisfy the QoS requirement given
the current geographic distribution of CHs, they have to wait
for the possible next-hop transmission. Thus, the performance
of previous-hop has direct influence on that of the next-hop.
We consider a best-effort scheme to minimize the average
delay of current participant players. During the process of
coalition formation game, a CR may leave its current coalition
and join in another one. Next, we give the switch operation
rule.
Definition 3: Given m 2 Smt 2 P , if the payoff of CR
m joining in coalition Sm0t is larger than that in coalition
Smt , i.e., 
m0t
m > mtm , then CR m will perform a switch
operation from Smt to Sm0t . The comparison relation is
defined as Sm0t m Smt . After that, the current collectionP is turned into a new collection P 0 = (PnfSmt ; S0mtg) [fSmtnfmg; S0mt [ fmgg.
C. Coalition Formation Algorithm
Based on the concepts of coalition formation, CRs who
satisfy the signal to noise ratio (SNR) threshold can participate
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in the current coalition game to form disjoint coalitions. The
SNR threshold is denoted by min. Specifically, if the payoff
of a CR in the current coalition is lower than joining in another
coalition, it will perform a switch operation. Based on the
rules mentioned above, the coalition formation algorithm can
be constructed as follows.
Step 1: Initialization of coalitions. Based on SNR, the
preference order for each CR towards all of the CHs is
calculated. The preference order is in descending order of
SNRs, and the first element is the most favorite choice of the
CR. The SNR of CR m who chooses CH mt as transmitter is
given by
mt;m =
PDh
2
mtm
N0
=
PDd
 
mtmh
2
s;mtm
N0
: (11)
Among all of the CHs, if one of them can satisfy the SNR
threshold min for CRm, i.e., 

mt;m  min, thenm is added
into the set G0. Meanwhile, CR m in the set of G0 temporally
joins in the coalition Smt where mt is in the first place of
preference order.
Step 2: Coalitions for resource allocation. Each CUE
chooses to join in its preferred coalition which brings it the
highest payoff based on (10). Since there might be two or more
CUEs that prefer the same coalition, it is necessary to ensure
that at most one CUE would stay in one coalition. Hence,
we design a strategy that only the CUE obtains the highest
payoff from a coalition can join in it, while the payoffs of
other CUEs choosing the same coalition are set to be a high
negative value. Thus, they will give up joining in the coalition
and turn to other coalitions, which avoids the conflicts.
Step 3: Switch operation to form coalitions. After a
temporal collection of coalitions P is formed, CRs have
opportunities to change their choices based on the payoffs
defined in (9). According to Definition 3, CR m will leave its
current coalition Smt and join in coalition Sm0t if it satisfies

m0t
m > mtm , that is, Sm0t m Smt . For 8m 2 G0, the system
performs the leave-and-join switch operation iteratively until
none of CRs in G0 intend to leave their current coalitions and
join in other ones. Then, a partition P 0 for the set G0 is formed,
which satisfies P 0 G0 P .
Step 4: Final coalition formation and content distribution.
To construct the final partition, Step 2 and step 3 need to be
repeated until both the CUEs and CRs will not change their
choices. We call the time that final partition is formed as the
decision point. After that, the CH in each coalition starts to
broadcast data on the RB which is shared by the CUE in the
same coalition. The life of a coalition ends when the requested
content is distributed to every CR in the coalition.
Step 5: Next-hop transmissions. In the end of each time slot,
the BS checks if any multicast group finishes the transmission.
It is possible that multiple groups finish the content distribution
in the same time slot. Then, the CRs obtained the content in
current time slot will act as CHs in the next-hop transmissions.
The system updates the constituent, and the algorithm turns to
Step 1. It is noted that the algorithm will conclude when every
CR obtains the content, or there is no CH that can satisfy the
QoS of a CR.
Algorithm 1 Coalition Formation Algorithm
1: Input: M, C, Ts, M , K, Nmax.
2: Initialization: G0 = ;, 
 = ;
3: if Any of coalitions finishes its content distribution process
then
4: for 8 m 2M do
5: Calculate the SNR towards every CHs and the pref-
erence order.
6: if max(mt;m)  min then
7: G0 = G0 [ fmg, Smt = Smt [ fmg, where mt =
argmax(mt;m)
8: end if
9: end for
10: Set N = 0.
11: while N  Nmax do
12: Calculate the payoffs for each CUE towards each
coalition.
13: while 9c =2 Smt ; 8mt and 9Smt \ C = ; do
14: for 8c 2 C do
15: Smt = Smt [ fcg, mt = argmax(mtc )
16: end for
17: Put the coalitions that has been chosen by multiple
CUEs into set 
.
18: for Smt 2 
 do
19: for c 2 C do
20: if mtc = max(
mt
i ), 8c 2 Smt then
21: CUE c will stay in Smt .
22: 8i 2 Smt ; i 6= c, mti are reset as a high
negative value. Remove CUE i from Smt ,
and remove coalition Smt from the set 
.
23: end if
24: end for
25: end for
26: end while
27: for m 2 G0 do
28: Calculate m
0
t
m towards its potential coalition.
29: if 9m0tm > mtm then
30: Remove CR m from Smt .
31: Sm0t = Sm0t [ fmg.
32: end if
33: end for
34: Update loop index with N = N + 1.
35: end while
36: end if
The proposed coalition formation algorithm is summarized
in Algorithm 1.
D. Convergence and Stability
For each CR, it always looks for a better coalition by the
switch operation process, but if a CR finds that there exists
no better choice, it will remain in the current coalition. If all
the CRs find that their current coalitions are their respective
best choices, the partition structure of the player set would
no longer change. Since the number of partitions for a given
set is Bell number [40], the leave-and-join operation will
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terminate and the algorithm will converge to a final partition
in finite iterations. Therefore, no matter what initial partition
the proposed approach starts from, it will end with a final
partition, defined as Pf .
Here, the stability of the final partition can be proved by
using the concept from hedonic games [41], as follows.
Definition 4: A partition P is Nash-stable, if 8m 2 M,
m 2 Smt 2 P , it has Smt m Smk [ fmg for all Smk 2
P [ f;g.
Proposition 1: The partition at each decision point in the
proposed coalition formation algorithm is Nash-stable.
Proof: For the multihop scenario, we consider the stability
of the final partition at each decision point, i.e., the time
any multicast groups are initiated. Assume that the final
partition Pf at a certain decision point is not Nash-stable,
then there must exist a CR m 2 M, m 2 Smt 2 Pf , and
a coalition Smk 2 Pf , which satisfy Smk [ fmg m Smt .
According to the coalition formation based algorithm, CR
m can perform a leave-and-join operation since it finds a
better choice. However, based on the initial setting that Pf
is a final partition, which means that there is no leave-and-
join operation, it appears a contradiction. Therefore, we can
conclude that any final partition Pf at a certain decision point
in the proposed coalition formation algorithm must be Nash-
stable.
E. Complexity
The proposed coalition formation algorithm is performed in
an iterative way. The complexity depends on the initial states
of the involved users including CHs, CRs, and CUEs. Here, we
consider the worst case computational complexity to identify
the efficiency of the proposed algorithm.
In the initialization of coalitions, each CR detects the
channel state information (CSI) towards every available CH
and calculates the corresponding SNR. The computational
complexity of obtaining the SNR list for each CR is O(K),
and the complexity of obtaining preference order by sorting
the SNR values for each CR is O(K log(K)). For the coalition
formation process, the worst case is that all the CUEs choose
to join in the same coalition and all the CRs also have the
same choice in each switch operation process. In this paper,
the objective is to minimize the network average delay, which
leads to a centralized way in the coalition formation process.
Therefore, the complexity of calculating the payoffs for all the
CUEs are O(CK), and the complexity of coalition formation
for resource allocation and switch operation is O(C+M)K. In
the worst case, there will beK iterations. Thus, the complexity
of coalition formation process is O((C +M)K2).
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, the proposed cross-layer optimization al-
gorithm is compared with two heuristic approaches, that
is, non-cooperative approach [39], [42] and random access
approach [42]. In non-cooperative approach, each CR chooses
its preferred CH based on SNR maximization, and RBs are
randomly allocated to the multicast groups. The random access
approach is served as a lower benchmark, in which the CRs
TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS.
Simulation Parameter Value
Cell radius R 500 m
Pathloss exponent  4
Transmit power of D2D users PD 23 dBm
Transmit power of CUEs PC 23 dBm
Noise power N0 -114 dBm
Number of CRs M  K 8  32
Number of CUEs/RBs C 6  16
Number of OCHs K 6  16
SINR threshold of D2D links Dmin 25 dB
SINR threshold of cellular links Cmin 25 dB
Length of time slots Ts 1 ms
Size of a content package A 2 Mb
-500 -400 -300 -200 -100 0 100 200 300 400 500
Location in X (m)
-500
-400
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
400
500
Lo
ca
tio
n 
in
 Y
 (m
)
OCH
CR
CUE
BS
First hop transmission
Second hop transmission
Third hop transmission
Fig. 3. An illustration of user locations and multihop D2D transmissions
with K OCHs, (M  K) CRs and C CUEs (M = 30;K = 6; C = 6).
and CHs in the network form multicast groups randomly, and
RBs are also allocated in a random way. Table I shows the
simulation parameters.
There are C cellular users randomly distributed in a cellular
network with a radius of R = 500 m. M D2D users, which
includes K OCHs, are randomly located in a hotspot area. Fig.
3 gives an illustration of content distribution with C = 6,M =
30, and K = 6. At the beginning, multiple OCHs broadcast
the content to the CRs in their respective groups. After some of
CRs receive the content, they continue to broadcast it to others.
In this case, there exists at most a three-hop transmission link.
At last, there still exist two users that cannot obtain the content
by D2D multicast transmissions and have to turn to cellular
mode.
Fig. 4 shows the content distribution efficiency by employ-
ing different approaches. The percentage of CHs is defined
as the number of D2D users who have already obtained
the content divided by the total number of D2D users. We
set C = 6, M = 30 and K = 6 at the beginning of
the simulation. As shown in Fig. 4, the percentages of CHs
achieved by all three approaches increase monotonically with
time. However, the unit increments of CHs percentage per time
slot decrease monotonically with time. The reason is that most
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Fig. 5. Network average delay vs. number of CRs (K = 6; C = 6).
D2D users can obtain the content through multicast groups in
the beginning time slots. It is noted that the proposed approach
is able to achieve 98:6% CHs at 3000 ms. In comparison,
the percentages of CHs corresponding to the non-cooperative
approach and the random access approach are only 82:4% and
76:0%, respectively. In the two heuristic approaches, each CR
searches for CHs in a non-cooperative way or even random
way, which would not consider the quality of experience (QoE)
of other users, and may lower multicast efficiency. In the
proposed approach, each CR joins in a coalition to maximize
its payoff, which highly depends on the average delay within
the coalition. Therefore, the proposed approach results in a
better performance on the transmission efficiency.
Fig. 5 shows the average delay of all the D2D users
versus the number of original CRs. As the number of CRs
increases, there may be more CRs that experience bad direct
channel conditions from OCHs, thus have to obtain the content
through multihop transmissions. Consequently, the average
delay goes up monotonically with the number of CRs in-
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Fig. 6. Network average delay vs. number of RBs (M = 30;K = 6).
creasing. Moreover, we can see that the proposed approach
achieves much better performance on average delay compared
to the non-cooperative approach and random access approach,
which can be also found in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7. The proposed
approach encourages CRs to cooperate with each other to form
coalitions with the objective of minimizing the average delay,
so it has a better performance. In particularly, the random
access approach performs worst among the three ones, since
the selections of CHs and RBs are completely random.
Fig. 6 presents the average delay versus the number of
RBs. It is observed that the average delay achieved by all
three approaches decreases when the number of RBs increases.
The reason is that a larger amount of spectrum resources
supports to establish more multicast groups at the same time.
As mentioned above, the proposed approach performs better
than the others, and we find that the superiority becomes more
obvious as the number of RBs keeps rising. When the number
of spectrum resources is larger than the number of multicast
groups, there will be an opportunity for the groups to access
a better RB from the perspective of average delay, which is
similar to the effect of multiuser diversity. In contrast, the
two heuristic approaches achieve less performance gains since
RBs are allocated in a random fashion. For this reason, the
performance gap between the proposed approach and the other
ones becomes larger with the number of RBs increasing.
Fig. 7 shows the average delay versus the number of OCHs.
As is shown, when the number of OCHs is 6, the average
delay achieved by the proposed approach is 883:0 ms; and
when the number of OCHs reaches 16, the average delay is
652:7 ms, which decreases about 26:1%. When the number
of OCHs grows, there may be more CRs that can obtain the
requested content directly from single-hop transmission, thus
the average delay of the network is reduced.
Fig. 8 shows the percentage of CHs versus number of
OCHs under different SNR threshold. On one hand, we find
that the percentage of CHs at the end of content distribution
raises up when the number of OCHs increases continuously.
It implies that more users provide the requested content, a
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better distribution performance can be reached. On the other
hand, the percentage of CHs decreases slightly with the SNR
threshold increasing. Due to a relatively high QoS requirement,
some of the CRs that experience bad channel conditions cannot
join in multicast groups to obtain the content through D2D
communication, thus have to switch to cellular mode instead.
Therefore, as depicted in Fig. 8, both the SNR threshold of
users and the number of OCHs distributed in the network have
impact on the performance of the proposed approach.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated the content distribution prob-
lem by multihop D2D communication with decentralized
content providers locating in the networks. Moreover, we
considered a cross-layer optimization that jointly design the
route of content distribution and spectrum allocation. First,
we formulated the problem as a coalitional game based on the
payoffs of users. Then, we proposed a time-varying coalition
formation based algorithm to solve the problem. Finally, the
proposed approach was validated and compared with two
heuristic approaches. Simulation results show that the game-
theoretical approach effectively reduces the time spent in the
content distribution and its performance on average delay
is much better than that of non-cooperative approach. By
incorporating more RBs into the network, the performance of
the proposed approach can be significantly increased. When
there exist more original content holders in the hotspot, both
the percentage of users obtaining the content and the network
average delay can achieve better performances. In future
works, we will focus on the distributed caching schemes in
multihop D2D networks.
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